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REX NON PROTEST PECCARE??? THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE PUBLIC USE LIMITATION
ON EMINENT DOMAIN
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a universally recognized principle of constitutional law
that a taking of private property by eminent domain 2 must be for
a public useY However, the Supreme Court of the United States
1. "The king can do no wrong" is an ancient and fundamental
principle of the English Constitution. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (re-
vised 4th ed. 1968).
2. Eminent domain is that attribute of sovereignty which permits
the taking of private property by the government, or its deputized units,
for a public use. The definition contains the additional proviso that emi-
nent domain may only be exercised by payment of proper compensation to
the owner for his loss. See 1 R. BUSHONG, PENNSYLVANIA LAND LAW 143,
144 (1938); 2 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7 (3rd ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]; P. DRUM, THE LAW OF VIEWERS IN PENNSYL-
VANIA § 101a, at 142 (1940); I. LEVEY, CONDEMNATION IN U.S.A. § 1 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as LEVEY]; J. Sackman, The Right to Condemn, 29 ALB. L.
REV. 177 (1965).
3. See, e.g., Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1884); Gralapp v. Missis-
sippi Power Co., 280 Ala. 368, 194 So. 2d 527 (1967); Alaska Gold Recovery
Co. v. Northern Mining & Trading Co., 7 Alaska 386 (Dist. Ct. 1926), rev'd
on other grounds, 20 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1927); Cienega Cattle Co. v. Atkins,
59 Ariz. 287, 126 P.2d 481 (1942); City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark.
1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967); Sutter County v. Nicols, 152 Cal. 688, 93 P.
872 (1908); Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 14 P.2d 1098
(1932); Farist Steel Co. v. Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278, 22 A. 561 (1891);
Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce 549, 83 A. 1036 (1912); Hirsh v. Block,
267 F. 614, 50 App. D.C. 56, rev'd on other grounds, 256 U.S. 135 (1920);
Marvin v. Housing Authority, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938); Beazley v.
De Kalb County, 210 Ga. 41, 77 S.E.2d 740 (1953); King v. Oahu R.R. &
Land Co., 11 Haw. 717 (1st Cir. Ct. 1899); Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho
256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931); Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Farina,
29 Ill. 2d 294, 194 N.E. 209 (1963); Kessler v. Indianapolis, 199 Ind. 420,
157 N.E. 547 (1927); Welding Supply Co. v. City of Des Moines, 256 Iowa
973, 129 N.W.2d 666 (1964); Strain v. Cities Service Co., 148 Kan. 393, 83
P.2d 124 (1938); Bell's Comm. v. Board of Educ., 192 Ky. 700, 234 S.W. 311
(1921); Crichton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946); Paine v. Savage,
126 Me. 121, 136 A. 664 (1927); Shreve v. City of Baltimore, 243 Md. 613,
222 A.2d 59 (1966); Sellors v. Town of Concord, 329 Mass. 259, 107 N.E.2d
784 (1952); Shizas v. Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589 (1952); Powell v.
Town Bd., 175 Minn. 395, 221 N.W. 527 (1928); Wise v. Yazoo City, 96
Miss. 507, 51 So. 453 (1910); City of Kirkwood v. Cronin, 259 Mo. 207, 168
S.W. 674 (1914); Billings Sugar Co. v. Fish, 40 Mont. 256, 106 P. 565
(1910); Burger v. City of Beatrice, 181 Neb. 213, 147 N.W.2d 784 (1967);
Exeter & Hampton Elec. Co. v. Harding, 105 N.H. 317, 199 A.2d 298 (1964);
State v. Lanza, 48 N.J. Super. 362, 137 A.2d 622, aff'd 27 N.J. 516, 143 A.2d
571 (1958); Board of County Comm'rs v. Sykes, 74 N.M. 435, 394 P.2d 278
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has not in this century held a use to be private which a state court
has declared to be public.4 The paucity of reversals on this con-
stitutional question 5 becomes understandable after analyzing the
evolution of the public use doctrine. So irrefutably has the "won-
derous elasticity" of the public use limitation been demonstrated
that the principle that private property can be condemned only
for public purposes can accurately be viewed as having been re-
pudiated. 7 There is only one inconsistency created by the demise
(1964); Cannata v. City of New York, 24 Misc. 2d 694, 204 N.Y.S.2d 982
(1960); State Highway Comm. v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 156 S.E.2d 248
(1967); Bigelow v. Draper, 6 N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570 (1896); O'Neal v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 3 Ohio St. 2d 53, 209 N.E.2d 393 (1965); Blincoe
v. Choctaw R.R., 16 Okla. 286, 83 P. 903 (1905); Smith v. Cameron, 106 Or.
1, 210 P. 716 (1922); Lacy v. Montgomery, 181 Pa. Super. 640, 124 A.2d 492
(1956); Re Rhode Island Suburban R.R. Co., 22 R.I. 457, 48 A. 591
(1901); Riley v. Charleston Union Station, 71 S.C. 457, 51 S.E. 485 (1905);
Illinois Central R.R. v. East Sioux Falls Quarry Co., 33 S.D. 63, 144 N.W.
724 (1913); Nashville Water Co. v. Dunlop, 138 S.W.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. Tenn.
1940); Weyel v. Lower Colorado River Authority, 121 S.W.2d 1032 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938); Highland Boy G.M. Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296
(1904); Deerfield River Co. v. Wilmington Power & Paper Co., 83 Vt. 548,
77 A. 862 (1910); Rudee Inlet Authority v. Bastion, 206 Va. 906, 147 S.E.2d
131 (1966); City of Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wash. 2d 430, 437 P.2d
171 (1968); State v. Montgomery, 94 W. Va. 189, 117 S.E. 888 (1923);
Schumm v. Milwaukee County, 258 Wis. 256, 45 N.W.2d 673 (1951); Grover
Land Co. v. Lovella Irr. Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 P. 43 (1913).
4. NICHOLS § 7.212[2]. Nichols states that "the Court has never
actually held a use to be private which the courts of a state ... have de-
clared to be public." Id. (emphasis added). However, this statement
is somewhat erroneous. In Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403
(1896), the Court reversed a decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court
ordering the railroad to allow a private combination to construct a grain
elevator on its property. The Court held the order as "a taking of private
property for the private use of another." Id. at 417. See also Comment,
The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
YALE L.J. 609, n.54 (1949).
5. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision is a limitation upon the
power of the United States as is the fifth amendment mandate that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. The fourteenth amendment, however, imposes both of these
limitations on the states. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403
(1896); NICHOLS § 7. 31L1I]. Thus, a condemnation under the federal or
state constitutions can only occur if the prerequisite is met that it be for
a public use. See also E. SNITZER, PENNSYLVANIA EMINENT DOMAIN § 406-2.1
(1965).
6. Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An
Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 601 (1949). The writer of this Com-
ment described the natural law concept of "public good" in eminent do-
main cases as being of "wonderous elasticity."
7. Id. 614. See generally LEVEY at 172. Comment, Compensation for
Public Use--Congressional Action and the Fifth Amendment, 32 TENN.
L. REv. 615, 630 (1965):
of the public use limitation-it expurgates a part of the United
States Constitution.
This Comment will analyze the status of the public use doc-
trine. While it is generally accepted that the phrase "public use"
escapes precise definition,s the tests used in determining a public
use can be identified. These tests,9 and the constitutional ques-
tions arising from them, will be examined. A conclusion will be
offered regarding the status of the guarantee that no private prop-
erty will be taken for public use without just compensation, 10 and
a recommendation as to appropriate future judicial action will be
submitted.
II. THE LIMITS OF 'PUBLIC USE"
The term eminens dominium, from which the modern concept
eminent domain has devolved, was coined by Grotius in 1625.11
Since its manifestation in the Bill of Rights," the dialectic of
eminent domain has undergone substantial revision. Because the
states are subject to the same constitutional limitations as the fed-
eral government in their exercise of eminent domain, 13 the pri-
mary conceptual problem to be discussed is the meaning of the
federal provision, though reference to state court decisions is
necessary. The power of eminent domain is an inherent attribute
of sovereignty existing without constitutional authorization;
14
When faced with potential expropriation . . . an owner might
reasonably ask two questions. First, can the Government use
my land for this purpose? And, if so, to what extent will I be
compensated? While the answer to the first question will almost
always be in the affirmative, the second may involve a great deal
of controversy.
8. Lerch v. Maryland Port Authority, 240 Md. 438, 444, 214 A.2d 761,
767 (1965); New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 340,
1 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1936); Johnson City v. Clominger, 213 Tenn. 71, 74,
372 S.W.2d 281 (1963); NICHOLS § 7.2; Comment, What Constitutes A Pub-
lic Use, 23 ALBANY L. REV. 386, 387 (1959).
9. See discussion beginning note 17 supra.
10. U.S. CONST. amend V.
11. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLE AC PAEIs, Lib. III, Cap. xx. Grotius also
first indicated that public use and compensation are requisite to eminent
domain. Id. Lib. II Cap. xv, § vii.
12. U.S. CONST. amend V: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation."
13. NICHOLS § 7.31[l]. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S.
403, 417 (1896): "The taking by a state of the private property of one
person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the private use of
another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth
Article of Amendment of the Constitution."
14. See authority cited note 2 supra. This statement is a legal con-
clusion, not a philosophical premise. The first exercise of this "inherent
attribute" in Anglo-American history occurred shortly after the Battle of
Hastings in 1066. William the Conqueror, in order to buy the loyalty of
his followers, declared all English lands forfeited. He then established the
tenurial system of holding land whereby the king was lord over all estates.
Note, Diminishing Property Rights, 69 W. VA. L. REV. 171 (1967). Another
example of land confiscation was Henry VII's dissolution of lesser
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therefore, the mandate of the fifth amendment is a limitation upon
rather than an extension of governmental power.15 The first con-
tested use of eminent domain by the federal government occurred
in 1875.16 By that time, however, the states had adopted two very
different standards in determining whether a taking was for
public use-the tests of "use by the public" and "public advan-
tage."
17
The narrower "use by the public" test requires that the pub-
lic have at least a right to use or enjoy the property taken.'
8
The broader test of "public advantage" holds that any taking which
tends to contribute to the general welfare, promote the prosperity
of any considerable number of people, or benefit the whole commun-
ity is a public use.19 The conflict between these evaluations of
public use raged throughout the nineteenth century, resulting in
"a massive body of case law, irreconcilable in its inconsistency,
confusing in its detail and defiant of all attempts at classifi-
cation. '20 By 1896, when the Supreme Court declared that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment placed the federal lim-
itation upon the states,21 both tests were well supported.2  Al-
monasteries in 1536, which was at least partially based on the rationaliza-
tion that the revenues accruing therefrom would be used for "public pur-
poses". MAYNARD, THE CROWN AND THE CROSS 131 (1950). The theory
that confiscation is an inherent attribute of sovereignty was apparently ac-
cepted in England by this time, though not articulated by Grotius until
1636.
Inasmuch as sovereignty in the American system theoretically lies in
the people, however, it is submitted that the concept of eminent domain as
an inherent state power is philosophically repugnant. The rule is there-
fore accepted arguendo, as a generally accepted legal conclusion. The
view that eminent domain is in derogation of common right has also had
its judicial adherents. See, e.g., Comn'rs of Beaufort County v. Bonner,
153 N.C. 66, 68 S.E. 970, 972 (1910).
15. NICHOLS §§ 7.1[1], 7.31[1]. See, e.g., United States v. City of Tif-
fin, 190 Fed. 279, 280 (N.D. Ohio 1911); Burnett v. Central Neb. Pub. Power
& Irr. Dist., 147 Neb. 458, 465, 23 N.W.2d 661, 666 (1946) (dictum).
16. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
17. NICHOLS § 7.2[1], [2]. See generally LEVEY § 17 at 204.
18. NICHOLS § 7.2[1]; See e.g., Shasta Power Co. v. Walker, 149 F. 568
(N.D. Cal. 1906); Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 59, 64 (N.Y.
1837); Comment, What Constitutes A Public Use, 23 ALBANY L. REV. 390
(1959).
19. NICHOLS § 7.2[2]. See e.g., Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County,
262 U.S. 700 (1922); Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 276, 289 P.2d 1
(1955); Jacobs v. Clearview W.S. Co., 220 Pa. 388, 69 A. 870 (1908).
20. Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Ad-
vance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. at 606 (1949).
21. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896).
22. CUSHMAN, EXCESS CONDEMNATION 279 (1917); Comment, The
Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 608 (1949).
though the Supreme Court refused on several occasions to adopt ei-
ther test,2 3 in 1916 the Court, through Mr. Justice Holmes, clearly
rejected the narrow use of the public test.24 The public use doc-
trine now refers to the broad "public benefit" test.25
Berman v. Parker,26 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1954, exemplifies the connotation of "public benefit" today.
There the federal government had authorized a private agency to
demolish portions of the District of Columbia on an area by area
basis. The plan was to eliminate buildings which were structurally
unsafe as well as those unsightly but otherwise sound. The
lands were to be resold to individuals or other developers. The
appellants, who owned a department store within the condemned
area, claimed that the government was violating their fifth amend-
ment rights since their property was to be put "under the manage-
ment of a private, not a public agency and redeveloped for pri-
vate, not public use."'27 The Court rejected the claim basing its
decision on the "public interest":
28
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as- well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled .... If those who govern the District of Co-
lumbia decide that the Nation's Capitol should be beautiful
as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amend-
ment that stands in the way.
2 9
The Berman decision demonstrates that the "public interest"
will override any property right of the individual. What then, are
the limits of the " [p] ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and
quiet, [or] law and order"? 0 Since the Constitution restricts the
power of the state to take private property,31 what are the consti-
tutional limits of the public benefit test?
In Berman, the land in question was the appellant's private prop-
erty. The legislature passed an act ordering its condemnation by
a private agency. The land was to be resold to a private corpora-
tion or individual. Yet the fifth amendment did not limit the
power of eminent domain since the property in question was not
"beautiful."
32
23. E.g., Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905).
24. Mt. Veron-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate
Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
25. NiCHOLS § 7.2[2]. Otherwise stated by various courts, the broad
view of "public use" connotes "public advantage", or that which is "con-
ducive to community prosperity." Id.
26. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
27. Id. at 31.
28. Id. at 32.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Id. at 32.
31. See authority cited note 15 supra.
32. But see NICHOLS § 7.1.
When the state constitutions were adopted, the taking of property
for private use in its bold form, as the seizure of the property of
Comments
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The 1963 case of Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. New York Port
Authority33 again exposes the meaning of "public use" in the
modern context. Concurrent New York and New Jersey legislation
had authorized the Port of New York Authority to condemn prop-
erty for the construction of a World Trade Center. This Center was
statutorily defined as "a facility of commerce ... for the cen-
tralized accommodation of functions, activities and services for or
incidental to the transportation of persons, the exchange, buying,
selling and transportation of commodities in world trade and com-
merce. . ". ."34 Also included was the power to condemn land for
the construction of structures not functionally related to the
project's purpose, but solely for "the production of incidental reve-
nue. . for the expenses of all or part of the port development proj-
ect." 35  The New York Appellate Division stated that though a
World Trade Center would otherwise be a public purpose, the stat-
ute was unconstitutional in that "it granted a power to condemn
property to be used for no other purpose than the raising of reve-
nue .... "3 In reversing that decision, the New York Court of Ap-
peals relied upon historical and sociological data, plus its own good
sense of the general public welfare:
The history of western civilization demonstrates the cause
and effect relationship between a great port and a great
city. . . . [P]iers, markets and slum clearance even es-
thetic improvements have been held to be a public purpose.
• .. Nor can it be said that the use of property to produce
revenue to help finance the operation of those activities
that tend to achieve the purpose of the project does not it-
self perform such a function, provided, of course, that
there are in fact such other activities to be supported by in-
cidental revenue production. .... 37
Using the court's historical approach in criticizing this decision,
it is interesting to note that Henry VIII used a rationalization that
revenues would be used for public purposes in his dissolution of
monasteries in 1536.38 But the dissenting opinion 3 of Judge Van
one man and the bestowal of it upon another, was sufficiently
prohibited by the requirement of due process of law ... [I]t is
not within the power of a constitutional government to authorize
the taking of the property of an individual without his consent for
the private use of another, upon specious grounds of public advan-
tage, even upon the payment of full compensation." Id. at 7-10
to 13 (emphasis added).
33. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963).
34. Id. at 382, 190 N.E.2d at 404.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 383, 190 N.E.2d at 405.
38. See discussion and authority cited note 14 supra.
39. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 386, 190 N.E.2d 402, 407 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
Voorhis in Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. New York Port Authority
offers a constitutional and therefore more appropriate basis for
discussion. This dissent argued that the statute put
the Port Authority in the real estate business, by making it
a potential landlord, as it says itself at page 6 of its own
brief, of 'a community of firms engaged in direct import-
export activities. .. .'
Nothing in the statute indicates by what standard of
judgment selection is to be made from among this multi-
tude of private organizations engaged in export and im-
port .... 40
This [statute] raises constitutional questions, if the
Constitution any longer protects private property .... 41
Disregard of the constitutional protection of private
property and stigmatization of the small or not so small en-
trepreneur as standing in the way of progress has every-
where characterized the advance of collectivism. To hold
a purpose to be public merely for the reason that it is in-
voked by a public body to serve its ideas of the public
good. . . can be done only on the assumption that we have
passed the point of no return, that the trade, commerce
and manufacture of our principal cities can be conducted by
private enterprise only on a diminishing scale and that
private capital should progressively be displaced by public
capital which should increasingly take over .... 42
No more precise deprecation of the Courtesy decision can be of-
fered than the dissent of Judge Van Voorhis. However, the United
States Supreme Court summarily dismissed an appeal of the New
York decision "for want of a substantial federal question."
48
More recent decisions reflect the unlimited elasticity of the
public benefit test and the correlative destruction of the fifth
amendment public use limitation.44 These cases fall within that
area of eminent domain known as excess condemnation. Excess
condemnation is the taking of land in surplus of that necessary for
proposed public improvements when such a taking can also be
deemed for a public use.46  This type of eminent domain has tra-
ditionally been justified on three theories of public use:
40. Id. at 387, 190 N.E.2d at 408.
41. Id. at 388, 190 N.E.2d at 409.
42. Id. at 390-91, 190 N.E.2d at 411. See also Port of New York
Authority v. 62 Cordlandt St. Rlty. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 250, 273 N.Y.S.2d 337,
340 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Judge Van Voorhis).
43. Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Authority, 375 U.S.
78 (1963).
44. The state courts sometime prevent condemnation, though such de-
cisions now represent an exception to the rule. See, e.g., Hogue v. Port
of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 838-839, 341 P.2d 171, 193 (1959).
45. NICHOLS § 7.5122; Comment, The Public Use Limitation On Emi-
nent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YAL L.J. 606 (1949); Note, Emi-
nent Domain-Excess Condemnation-Avoidance of Excessive Severance
Damages Held a Valid Public Use, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 795 (1968). See, e.g.,
City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 439
(1930); Miro v. Superior Court for County of San Bernardino, 5 Cal. App.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
(1) The remnant theory, whereby property of such size
and shape as to be of no practical value to the owner is
condemned in excess of that required for the improve-
ment;
(2) The restrictive theory, whereby the condemning au-
thority acquires adjacent property in order to insure
the attainment of the principal object by placing es-
thetic or safety restrictions on the excess; and,
(3) The recoupment theory, whereby additional land is
acquired, usually in highway construction, to further
the main object and to diminish the overall cost to a
particular public improvement.
46
As late as 1968, it could be stated confidently that the public
use doctrine had not been extended to the point of accepting the
recoupment theory of excess condemnation.47 However, decisions
of the same year make even the existence of this limitation on the
power of eminent domain dubious. In Department of Public Works
v. Superior Court of Merced County48 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia destroyed perhaps the last defense against governmental
usurpation of private property. In this case, the condemnor sought
to compel the trial court to proceed with condemnation of three
parcels of real estate instead of two. The Department of Public
Works had built a freeway across a farm owned by one Rodoni
which had landlocked a remaining uncondemned parcel. Condem-
nation was sought upon this "excess" portion on the rationale that
it was required to prevent the state from paying "excessive" sever-
ance damages for having blocked the farm from access to the road.
It was argued that by selling that part of the parcel not needed
for freeway purposes, the cost of the project would be reduced. The
trial court recognize Rodoni's claim that taking property for such
a purely economic purpose was not a public use under the California
Constitution. 49 The department petitioned for a writ of mandate
ordering the Merced County Superior Court to proceed with the
condemnation. The Supreme Court of California reversed, order-
3d 91, 84 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1970); City of Carlsbad v. Ballard, 71 N.M. 397,
378 P.2d 814 (1963).
46. See NICHOLS § 7.5122[1], [2], [3]; Comment, The Public Use Limi-
tation of Excessive Severance Damages Held a Valid Public Use, 43 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 795 (1968).
47. Opinion of the Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910); Note,
Eminent Domain-Excess Condemnation-Avoidance of Excessive Sever-
ance Damages Held A Valid Public Use, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 795 (1968).
48. 65 Cal. Rptr. 342, 436 P.2d 342 (1968).
49. The California Constitution is similar to the United States Con-
stitution: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation having first been made to, or paid into court
for, the owner. . . ." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
ing the trial court to proceed if it found the taking justified to
avoid excessive severance or consequential damages.50 It per-
mitted the department to condemn the property "adjacent to high-
ways and other public works to be constructed by it and thereafter
convey the adjacent property to private parties subject to restric-
tions protecting the highway or other public use."51
The most significant aspect of the Merced County case, however,
involves the court's analysis of the three theories of excess condem-
nation. The court construed the enabling legislation as permitting
the taking of remnants. It also held valid condemnation for
the purpose of avoiding "excessive" severance damages. 52 The
taking was justified on the remnant theory,53 even though the land
was not negligible in size. Merced County represents the accept-
ance of the recoupment theory of excess condemnation. The facts
disclose that the land was condemned for a highway improvement
project and that excess condemnation was sought to diminish the
cost of the improvement. This case meets the definitional requi-
sites for recoupment.5 4 Conversely, the definition of the remnant
theory requires that the property be of such size that it would be of
no practical value to the owner, a circumstance absent from this
case. Thus, the court affected a specious expansion of the remnant
theory in order to find a public use without expressly adopting
the more repugnant recoupment theory. 5  It is submitted that
50. 65 Cal. Rptr. at 344, 436 P.2d at 344, 345.
51. Id. at 345, 436 P.2d at 345.
52. Id. at 346, 347, 436 P.2d at 346. Severance damages are the pay-
ments made to condemnees for hardship caused by having their property
landlocked by the taking necessary for the public improvement.
53. Id.:
Although a parcel of 54 landlocked acres is not a physical
remnant, it is a financial remnant: its value as a landlocked
parcel is such that severance damages might equal its value.
Remnant takings have long been considered proper .... There is
no reason to restrict this theory to the taking of parcels negligible
in size....
54. Nichols § 7.5122 3:
[The recoupment theory] .... although sanctioned in countries
in which the power of the legislature is not restricted by
one written constitution, involves the taking of the property of
one person and the sale of it to another for his private use and,
until recently at least, was of doubtful validity in the United
States. ....
Nichols cites the Merced County case for the qualification that recoup-
ment was not recognized "until recently at least". See NichoLs § 7.5122 [3]
n.7 citing People v. Superior Court of Merced County, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342,
436 P.2d 342 (1968) (accepting recoupment theory); State Highway Dept.
v. 9.88 Acres of Land, 253 A.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1969) (rejecting recoup-
ment theory); Salisbury Land & Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth, 215
Mass. 371, 102 N.E. 619 (1913) (rejecting recoupment theory); Opinion of
the Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910) (rejecting recoupment the-
ory); State v. Buck, 94 N.J. Super. 84, 226 A.2d 840 (1967) (accepting re-
coupment theory).
55. The recoupment theory issue was not the only example of
stretched reasoning exhibited by the court in its desire to allow the con-
demnation. The California Constitution has a section extending the con-
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the acceptance of excess condemnation represents the latest mani-
festation "of the voracious appetite of acquisitive government."56
The argument in favor of the present meaning of "public use"
is represented by the following words:
The law must not, in the eyes of those persons it serves, ap-
pear absurd. In seeking to define and delimit the legal
construct, judges are spokesman for their society-'living
oracles' Blackstone would say-deriving their concept of
property from the imperceptibly changing community con-
sensus.
57
The meaning of the public use doctrine has changed by impercepti-
ble degrees with the community consensus. And the acceptance of
the consensus view rather than adherence to an objective principle
has negated any limitation of constitutional law. The legaliza-
tion of esthetic and excess condemnation reflects the sanction of
a concept developed "in countries in which the power of the legis-
lature is not restricted by one written constitution. "18 While legal
writers have observed for at least two decades that the public
benefit test has no limits,59 the judiciary has proceeded on a path
of intellectual abdication to legislative determinations of public
use. The courts have attempted to recognize the public use limita-
tion while expanding the scope of its application beyond reason-
able limits. Thus the public use doctrine represents a false barrier
against governmental abuse-a shibboleth used in deference
to the Constitution.
III. THE SouRcEs OF DECLINE
A. Judicial Review
The replacement of the "use by the public" test with the "public
purpose" criterion for determining the presence of a public use
demnation power of the legislature to include excess grounds for road and
development "to preserve the view, appearance, light, air and usefulness
of such public works." CAL. CONST. art. I § 14 . However, this provision
limits the area of condemnation to two-hundred feet. The department
wished to condemn more than two hundred feet. Thus, if section 142
applied, no more than the two hundred feet could be condemned. The court
ruled section 14 inapplicable, which destroyed the two-hundred foot
limitation. Thus, the necessity for confronting the recoupment theory was
presented, since constitutionality must be under the general provision, CAL.
CONST. art. I. § 14.
56. 65 Cal. Rptr. at 349, 436 P.2d at 349 (dissenting opinion).
57. STROEBUCK, The Property Right of Access Versus the Power oj
Eminent Domain, 47 TEx. L. Rsv. 733, 764 (1969).
58. See quotation and authority cited note 54 supra.
59. See, e.g., NICHOLS § 7.2[3]; Comment, What Constitutes a Public
Use, 23 ALBANY L. REV. 386 (1959). The repudiation of the public use doc-
marked a significant change in the law of eminent domain. Jurists
generally assumed that the judiciary would serve as an adequate
bulwark against governmental abuse. An examination of the re-
spective attitudes of the legislature and judicary indicates the fal-
lacy of this assumption.
In every eminent domain case three major questions are pre-
sented: the necessity for the proposed improvement and for the
particular property to be condemned; the amount of compen-
sation to be awarded; and the existence of a public purpose.60 Fur-
thermore, the statute delegating authority to a private or public
agency must be construed since legislative action is required before
the power of eminent domain may be exercised.61  The require-
ment of due process raises constitutional issues which can be de-
termined ultimately only by the judiciary.6 2 However, the acute-
ness of judicial scrutiny is questionable. For example, it is gener-
ally held that the legislative authorization for a taking raises a
presumption that a public use exists.63 If the legislature declares
the presence of a public interest, the actuality of a public purpose
is established prima facie.64 Though application for a review will
be permitted for a clear abuse of discretion, 5 the legislature will
be given the benefit of any doubt. 6
Judicial review has been said to be confined to cases of mani-
fest arbitrariness and unreasonableness. 67 The criterion for re-
trine is often gleefully acknowledged. See Comment, The Public Use Limi-
tation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 614
(1949).
60. LEVEY at 167-68.
61. See, e.g., Beth Medrosh Hagodal v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267,
248 P.2d 732 (1952); Botts v. Southeastern Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 689,
10 S.E.2d 375 (1940); Strain v. Cities Service Gas Co., 148 Kan. 393, 83 P.2d
124 (1938); State Highway Commr. v. Union County Park Comm., 89 N.J.
Super. 202, 214 A.2d 446 (1965); Memphis Housing Authority v. Memphis
Laundry Cleaner Inc., 463 S.W.2d 677 (1971) (personal property); Brazos
River Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Harmon, 178 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1944).
62. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); Shoe-
maker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893); Black Rock Placer Mining
Dist. v. Summit W. & I. Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 513, 133 P.2d 58 (1943);
Varnadoe v. Housing Authority, 221 Ga. 467, 145 S.E.2d 493 (1965); see
also LEVEY at 171; NicHOLS § 7.4; B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: PART II RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 241 (1965).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Hunting Rights of Swan Lake Hunting
Club, 237 F. Supp. 290 (D. Miss. 1964); see also LEVEY at 171; NicHoLs
§ 7.4[1].
64. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Government of Virgin Is-
lands v. 50.05 Acres of Land, 185 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vir. Is. 1960); see also
NIcHOLS § 7.4[1].
65. NICHOLS § 7.4[l.
66. City of Menlo Park v. Artino, 151 Cal. App. 261, 268, 311 P.2d
135, 140 (1957) ; LEVEY at 172.
67. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); State




versal is whether the taking constitutes fraud, bad faith, or abuse
of discretion. 8 Thus, the ultimate question to be resolved is not
whether the use is actually a public one, but whether the legislature
might reasonably have considered it to be public.69 This approach
parallels the public purpose test, which holds essentially that a use
is public if the government has the power to undertake the particu-
lar function in question. 70 However, it seriously lessens the degree
of protection against violations of constitutional rights.
While the rules governing judicial review of eminent domain
cases adhere to the long recognized presumption of constitution-
ality which attaches to legislative action, 7' it is observed that the
treatment accorded claims of violated rights in condemnation pro-
ceedings is dissimilar to that of other constitutional rights. For ex-
ample, in the "criminal rights" field, the Supreme Court has stated,
in relation to the right to remain silent, that the state, not the indi-
vidual, must "shoulder the entire load";72 the Court has energeti-
cally protected these rights. It is suggested that the basic similari-
ties between civil liberties and property rights reflect a jurispru-
dential inconsistency with regard to the question of judicial review.
Both the right to remain silent and right to be free from a taking
of one's property for a private use are protected by the fifth amend-
ment. Both provisions relating to these rights were intended to be
limitations on government power. "If balance we must, should we
not place on the individual's side the importance of the institu-
tion of property in a free society, '73 just as we set the balance in
favor of the individual where questions of criminal rights are con-
cerned? The answer of the courts has been negative.
Viewing together the requirements for judicial review and the
overbroad public benefit test, the danger to individual rights in
property cases is manifest. First, a test has been developed which
68. Miro v. Superior Court for County of San Bernardino, 5 Cal. App.
3d 91, 84 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1970); Canal Authority v. Hayman, 243 So. 2d 131
(Sup. Ct. Fla. 1970); see Ghingher and Ghingher, A CONTEMPORARY AP-
PRAISAL OF CONDEMNATION IN MARYLAND, 30 MD. L. REv. 301, 304 (1970).
69. NICHOLS § 7.4; see generally Wilmington Housing Authority v. Nos.
500, 502, & 504 King St. 245 A.2d 856 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969).
70. See United States v. 4,450.72 Acres of Land, 27 F. Supp. 16 (D.
Minn. 1939); see also Comment, Compensation For Public Use-Congres-
sional Action and the Fifth Amendment, 32 TENN. L. REv. 615, 617, 619
(1965).
71. See, e.g., Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 153 (1943);
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938); Becker
Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1935).
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 460 (1966).
73. B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: PART II THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY at 233 (1965).
has no recognizable limits. Because the courts will not review state
or Congressional action except for "fraud, bad faith, or abuse of dis-
cretion," 7 the test reaches its logical extension which expunges
any definitive boundary in determining a public use. The situa-
tion exists where the legislature, not the judiciary, establishes the
constitutional guidelines for the public use limitation. Since the leg-
islature is guided by the momentary whims of the consensus rather
than adherence to any abstract principle, the interpreter of the Con-
stitution becomes not the court but the consensus. While no one can
doubt the judicial authority to abdicate its jurisdiction to the legis-
lative branch, the wisdom of such an approach is dubious. And
where some commentators believe "[n] either liberty nor prop-
erty is . . beyond the domain of public control, ' "5 it is submitted
that such conceptions adhere to anything but constitutional theory.
Thus the rules governing judicial review in eminent domain
are both the evidence and the source of the demise of all limits on
that governmental power. Inasmuch as the judicial default to leg-
islative judgment accelerated the unlimited expansion of the public
purpose test, it represents a source of decline. Inasmuch as the
judiciary's reluctance to review legislative fiat regarding condem-
nation exposes a dichotomy between the treatment accorded prop-
erty rights and other individual rights, it evidences a deeper source
of the public use limitation's expurgation. The repudiation of the
public use limitation has its roots in a deeper soil: the profundi-
ties of legal philosophy.
B. Philosophy of Law
With the gradual obscuration of the line between valid and in-
valid governmental action, the constitutional restraints upon public
usurpation of property rights has become merely theoretical and
"has all but most of its value as a practical restraint upon govern-
mental action."'76 The catalyst for this unprecedented unleashing of
government power in the American system lies in constitutional
theory.
Professor Bernard Schwartz in his commentary on the Consti-
tution7 7 gives a significant analysis of this philosophical develop-
ment. Recognizing that insofar as property rights are concerned
the paramount factor today is governmental power rather than in-
74. See authority cited note 68 supra.
75. HAMILTON, Property-According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864 (1932).
It is recognized, however, that the quoted statement is in accord with pres-
ent law. But see ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND PoWER at 45 (1948);
"Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest
political end."
76. B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF TIE UNITED
STATES: PART II. THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY at 232 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
ScHvRTz].
77. SCHWARTZ, PART III RiGHTS OF THE PERSON 4-10 (1968).
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dividual right,7 8 Schwartz attributes this decline to a theoretical
shift of emphasis to a "personal rights" versus "property rights"
dichotomy.7 9 This distinction between rights is traceable to the
1938 case of United States v. Carolene Products Co.8° which first
contracted the presumption of constitutionality in cases where
legislation appears on its face to contradict a specific Constitutional
prohibition. This decision foreshadowed a declaration four years
later that the freedoms of speech and religion occupied a "preferred
position" in the Constitution.8 ' Today, the "notion that personal,
as opposed to property, rights are in a prefered position in the or-
ganic scheme" 82 is the predominant philosophical theory underlying
constitutional law. In the context of the instant discussion, the
preferred position philosophy is clearly the source of the present
law of eminent domain. It is from this theoretical base that a re-
stricted scope of judicial review has grown. It is from this philo-
sophical origin that the unlimited governmental power to condemn
private property has developed.
The preferred position hypothesis can be deprecated on various
grounds. Professor Schwartz criticized it as being contrary to
the intent of the Founding Fathers.8 3 Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson felt that the theory created a fallacious distinction which
relegated property rights to a deferred position.8 4 It is addition-
ally urged that the preferred position philosophy negates the co-
cept of "rights." Rights do not exist in vacuo; they have signifi-
cance only in relation to the individual. There are no "public
rights" or "criminal rights," only personal rights. Of those, prop-
erty rights are but one. Any attempt to divorce the concept of a
"right" from the human entity must result in contradiction. It is sug-
78. Id. at 4.
79. Id. at 5.
80. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
81. See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
82. SCHWARTZ, op. cit., supra note 77, at 7. The theory has not been
adopted without dissent, however. Both Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
deprecated it:
The major weakness in the preferred-position philosophy is that
pointed out by Justice Jackson 1949. 'We cannot', he said, 'give
some constitutional rights a preferred position without relegating
others to a deferred position; we can establish no firsts without
thereby establishing seconds.' Under the preferred-position ap-
proach, personal rights may be elevated to an exalted status;
but the clear implication is that other constitutional rights are
marked as only secondary, to be relegated to a deferred position.
Id. at 8 citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (dissent-
ing opinion).
83. Id. at 8.
84. See discussion and authority cited note 82 supra.
gested that the theoretical groundings of constitutional law with
respect to property rights do reflect such an extension of the falla-
cious preferred rights theory. Its existence in the law of eminent
domain is manifest.
IV. CONCLUSION
The public use doctrine of eminent domain now represents a
major paradox in legal philosophy. On one hand, the fifth amend-
ment of the Constitution limits the power of government to the con-
demnation of property for public uses. On the other, the test of a
public use has been expanded to a degree which no longer recog-
nizes a significant boundary. The danger of this inconsistency
lies in "the invasion of private rights. . . , not from acts of Govern-
ment contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in
which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number
of the Constituents." 5 Its source lies in the legal quandary con-
cerning the nature of property rights.
A recommendation of future action must begin at the origin of
this paradox. It is therefore submitted that a reexamination of
the philosophical basis of the preferred rights theory is required.
The determination that property rights stand on an equal plane with
other constitutional guarantees would necessitate the revitalization
of judicial review in eminent domain cases. It would also require
the judiciary to formulate objective criteria for a finding of a pub-
lic use.
Though blatantly contradictory to the theoretical and practical
considerations of the law today, it is submitted that the "public bene-
fit" test must be abolished. This solution is not pragmatic; it is
philosophic. Excess and esthetic condemnation would be beyond
the constitutional limitation. But the fact that the constitution
does not guarantee all things to all people must be recognized. The
question in eminent domain cases involves two conflicting proposi-
tions-the desire of the consensus to have its demands met versus
the rights of the individual. In any such contest, the balance must
be in favor of individual rights if adherence to the constitution is
to be obtained.
Therefore, the following test for "public use" is suggested.
In the ordinary sense of the word "use," a "user" is connoted. The
Constitution requires that the use must be public; therefore, so
must be the "user." The only identifiable public user is the gov-
ernment. It is submitted that the objective test for a public use
must require that the condemned property be taken by the govern-
ment for functions over which the government will have control and
85. MADISON, WRraNs V 271-74 cited in 1 POLLAK, THE CowsTITu-
TION AND THE SUPREME COURT 122 (1966).
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operation. This test is not a mere return to the "use by the public"
criterion. It goes far beyond that test, which permitted con-
demnation of private property by railroads and utilities on the
theory that the public would ultimately use their facilities.8 6 The
"use by the public" test in these decisions also accepted the principle
that individual rights-liberty-must give way to public desire.
It is this concept that the "governmental user" test contradicts.
Under the "governmental user" principle, highways, government
buildings, armed forces facilities, government facilities for the
control of navigation and all other functions where condemnation
is recognized under the commerce clause87 would be constitutionally
acceptable. But in no instance would a private individual or cor-
poration be permitted to condemn the private property of another.
While this proposal may be rejected as anachronistic, specious, and
unduly restrictive, it is submitted that it is required if the fifth
amendment is to have any significance. It is not anachronistic,
since it has never been attempted before. It is specious only if
the uncompromising nature of liberty is rejected. It is unduly re-
strictive only to the extent that it requires the public to purchase
their demands under a consensual free enterprise system.
MARTIN J. KING
86. See NICHOLS § 7.2.
87. The commerce clause furnishes a primary source of authority for
governmental acquisition of land. See SCHWARTZ at 232. It is submitted,
however, that the Commerce Clause should only extend as far as the Fifth
Amendment limitation on the governments power to take private property.
